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line refineries and retailers in the U.S. Adapting the first-order con-
dition approach of static oligopoly games to the analysis of vertically
related oligopolies, we develop a novel framework for directly evaluat-
ing the strategic foreclosure eﬀect and the eﬃciency benefits associated
with vertical integration. Applying this framework, we find significant
evidence for both vertical foreclosure and eﬃciency benefits. The fore-
closure eﬀect dominates the eﬃciency benefits for more than half of
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1 Introduction
The analysis of the competitive eﬀects of vertical mergers is one of the long-
standing issues in antitrust policy. Following the Chicago School’s line of
argument that a vertically integrated firm cannot benefit from excluding its
competitors,1 vertical integration was widely accepted to be either competi-
tively neutral or procompetitive from the 1980s on. The U.S. Department of
Justice’s current “Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines” (1984) are reminiscent
of this rationale when pointing out that, by definition, vertical mergers in-
volve firms from diﬀerent markets, produce no immediate change in the level
of concentration in any of the relevant markets, and are thus less likely than
horizontal mergers to create competitive problems.2
A surge of recent theoretical developments suggests a reconsideration of
the Chicago School’s stance towards vertical mergers. Based on the notion
of “raising rivals’ costs” (Salop and Scheﬀman 1983, 1987), various authors
emphasize that vertical mergers may well have anticompetitive eﬀects. For
instance, prominent contributions by Salinger (1988), and Ordover, Saloner
and Salop (1990) demonstrate that, in models of vertically related oligopolies,
anticompetitive vertical foreclosure of independent downstream rivals may
emerge in equilibrium. Based on transaction costs analysis and the con-
cept of incomplete contracts, Hart and Tirole (1990), and Bolton and Whin-
ston (1993) similarly find that independent downstream competitors may be
strategically placed at a disadvantage.3
However, the policy implications of these studies remains largely unclear.4
The main reason for this shortcoming is the fact that the literature tends to
1Standard references include Bork (1978), and Posner and Easterbrook (1981). Perry
(1989) provides a survey. Rubinfeld and Singer (2001) summarize the Chicago School’s
approach to vertical foreclosure.
2The “Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines” were originally issued as part of “U.S. De-
partment of Justice Merger Guidelines, June 14, 1984”. Before the 1980s, U.S. antitrust
policy towards vertical mergers meandered between being largely uninterested and rela-
tively hostile. See White (1989) and Kwoka and White (1998) for surveys.
3Further contributions include O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992), McAfee and Schwartz
(1994), Choi and Yi (2000), Church and Gandal (2000), Chen (2001), and Rey and Tirole
(forthcoming).
4See Klass and Salinger (1995), Reiﬀen and Vita (1995), and Riordan and Salop (1995)
for critical reviews of the foreclosure literature.
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focus on demonstrating that foreclosure may be an equilibrium phenomenon
if firms are vertically integrated, rather than analyzing the trade oﬀ between
potential eﬃciency benefits and anticompetitive eﬀects of vertical integration.
In a recent contribution, Riordan (1998) examines this trade oﬀ in the context
of a dominant firm model, where the dominant firm is more eﬃcient in the
production of the final good because of an exogenous cost advantage. He finds
that vertical mergers may be welfare improving and provides an observable
indicator for welfare improving vertical mergers.5
The number of empirical studies on the competitive eﬀects of vertical
integration is remarkably small. Even though there is a fair amount of evi-
dence from isolated case studies (Allen 1971; Pass and Hawkins 1972), event
studies (Rosengreen and Meehan 1994; Snyder 1995), and econometric stud-
ies (McBride 1983; Grimm, Winston and Evans 1992; Waterman and Weiss
1992; Chipty 2001; Gilbert and Hastings 2001; Manuszak 2001), there are no
direct empirical tests of strategic foreclosure in real markets.6 In particular,
the econometric studies mainly focus on estimating possible price or cost
diﬀerences between integrated and separated firms at the downstream layer
and infer, based on the results, strategic behavior on the part of integrated
firms at the upstream layer. However, these cost diﬀerences may also be
explained by factors that are unrelated to the strategic incentives to raise ri-
vals’ costs, such as the realization of eﬃciency gains from vertical integration,
or the presence of a positive markup in the upstream market due to imper-
fect competition. In the latter case, only separated downstream firms face
a markup, since vertically integrated retailers secure inputs at the marginal
costs of their own upstream suppliers. That is, beside vertical foreclosure,
the cost diﬀerence between independent and integrated downstream competi-
tors may also be generated by imperfect competition upstream. These two
eﬀects, however, are not quantifiable per se without having access to data on
the upstream layer of the industry.
5A drawback of his model, however, is that strategic interactions between firms are
absent. The welfare analysis is therefore not directly applicable to vertically related
oligopolies.
6Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001) report direct empirical evidence for vertical fore-
closure in experimental markets.
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In this paper, we propose a novel framework that enables us to directly
test for strategic vertical foreclosure. In contrast to the existing econometric
literature on vertical foreclosure, we start from the observation that to pro-
vide direct econometric evidence on the vertical foreclosure of firms in the
downstream market, one must study strategic behavior on the vertically re-
lated upstream market. This observation follows from the fact that, in order
to foreclose its downstream rivals, an integrated firm must strategically ma-
nipulate its own upstream behavior. This manipulation, in turn, is reflected
in the integrated firms’ first-order condition for the profit-maximizing choice
of its upstream choice variable(s). Therefore, rather than inferring the up-
stream firms’ strategic behavior from estimated cost diﬀerences on the down-
stream market–i.e. from the postulated eﬀects of vertical foreclosure–our
framework focuses directly on the causes of vertical foreclosure by estimating
and testing for the upstream firms’ strategic behavior itself.
We apply our framework to the analysis of the supply of gasoline in the
U.S., where the competitive eﬀects of the integration of gasoline refineries
and retailers have long been subject to particular scrutiny. A number of
states have even enacted so-called “divorcement” regulations that restrict
the integration of gasoline refineries and retailers to prevent refineries from
attempting to eliminate their franchised dealers through predatory practices
(see Blass and Carlton 1999; Vita 1999).
We propose a simple model of vertically related oligopolies that exhibits
the essential characteristics of the refining stage of gasoline supply. Within
this model, we derive the first-order condition of a profit-maximizing refining
firm. It turns out that, apart from an additive foreclosure term, the relevant
first-order condition of a vertically integrated refining firm is similar to that
of a separated rival. This allows us to isolate the foreclosure eﬀects generated
by vertical integration into gasoline retailing. Our framework also allows us
to separate potential eﬃciency gains from the foreclosure eﬀects generated
by vertical integration. Letting refineries’ marginal costs vary over vertical
ownership structures enables us to estimate eﬃciency benefits from verti-
cal integration. In particular, we control and test for eﬃciency gains from
vertical integration by introducing diﬀerent marginal cost specifications for
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integrated and separated refining firms.7 Using various sources of micro data,
we identify and estimate the refining industry’s average supply relation. We
find significant evidence for both foreclosure eﬀects and eﬃciency benefits
associated with vertical integration. Vertical foreclosure is practiced exten-
sively, in particular by refining firms with large capacities. Strikingly, the
foreclosure eﬀect is found to dominate the eﬃciency benefit for more than
half of the refining firms in our sample, which covers all petroleum refining
firms active in January 1995. Vertical foreclosure is estimated to increase the
wholesale price by 0.2 to 0.6 cents per gallon.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly describe the
main economic characteristics of the gasoline refining industry, and discuss
its relations to crude oil production and gasoline retailing, respectively. Sec-
tion 3 sets out a simple theoretical model and derives explicit expressions
for the eﬃciency benefits and the strategic foreclosure eﬀects of vertical inte-
gration. Section 4 discusses the empirical specification of the model and the
associated problems to be considered when estimating the supply relation. It
also provides a short outline of the data sources used for this study. Section
5 reports the estimation results and discusses their economic implications.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Industry
The production and supply of gasoline involves a number of vertically related
activities, including the exploration and extraction of crude oil (production),
the manufacturing of refined gasoline (refining), and the marketing and dis-
tribution of gasoline to customers (retailing).8 Since we are interested in
testing whether vertically integrated refining firms are foreclosing indepen-
dent gasoline retailers, we henceforth focus our industry description on the
7Furthermore, we can control for the markup set by the oligopolistic competitors
upstream.
8As a fourth stage, one could consider the transportation of petroleum products. How-
ever, transportation is part of various stages of production and thus diﬃcult to fit into
the vertical supply chain. In addition, there is no data available as to which firms are
integrated into transportation. See Bindemann (1999) and Martin (2001) for surveys on
the vertical structure of the petroleum industry.
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refining industry for the reasons outlined above. We discuss the vertical
relations to crude oil production and gasoline retailing when necessary. In
particular, it will be useful to distinguish refining firms with diﬀerent degrees
of vertical integration.
First, we describe how gasoline is refined and marketed. In 1995, the U.S.
petroleum refining industry manufactured three diﬀerent grades of motor
gasoline still in use today: Regular, Midgrade, and Premium. Within each
of these grades, gasoline is physically homogeneous. On the wholesale market
for refined gasoline, independent retailers purchase gasoline in the diﬀerent
grades either from the rack of terminal facilities, or from dealer tank wagons
delivering to retail outlets. The supply on the wholesale market is limited by
the refineries’ capacities, and the wholesale prices at the terminals tend to
equate demand and supply. It is thus reasonable to argue that the Cournot-
Nash model is a useful approximation of the competitive process on the
wholesale market (Gilbert and Hastings 2001).
The refining industry manufactures the diﬀerent grades of gasoline through
a variety of physical and chemical processes.9 In addition to the vertical
ownership structure, the refining technology determines the profitability of
a firm. As pointed out by Chen (2002, 520), the profitability of a refining
operation depends on two important elements: (i) a stable supply of crude
oil, and (ii) the technical ability to process diﬀerent qualities of crude oil.
The first element suggests that there may be vertical integration economies
with crude oil production. The second element indicates that the adoption
of upgrading technologies designed to increase the yield of light-end prod-
ucts (such as gasoline) from refining crude oil of a given quality is essential
since these products promise higher revenues. Having access to flexible tech-
nologies enables a refinery to produce a higher proportion of light fuels from
low quality crude oil. However, refineries diﬀer in the extent to which they
have adopted these flexible technologies and thus feature diﬀerent process-
ing costs. According to Masseron (1990), the processing costs depend on
a number of refinery characteristics, such as the plant’s age, its processing
capacity, the complexity of the adopted refining process, and the type of
9See Leﬄer (1985) for a non-technical description of the refining process and its dis-
tinctive features.
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crude oil processed. We will indicate below how we control for the refineries’
characteristics in our estimations of the supply relation.
For our analysis, it is crucial to understand the horizontal and vertical
structure of the refining industry. The American Petroleum Institute (1996)
provides a full sample of the U.S. refineries and their operating capacities
as of January 1, 1995. Using the Petroleum Administration for Defense
(PAD) districts defined by the Department of Energy, the refining industry’s
horizontal structure can be summarized as in table 1. There are two things
worth noting. First, roughly two thirds of all refineries operate capacities of
less than 100’000 barrels per calendar day. Second, the distribution of plant
sizes varies considerably across PAD districts. For instance, the large U.S.
refineries with capacities above 300’000 barrels per calendar day are almost
exclusively located in the Gulf Coast area, whereas the Rocky Mountains
district is populated by small plants only. As eﬃciency gains will be shown
to vary with capacity, we should expect considerable regional diﬀerences in
the competitive eﬀects of vertical integration. We discuss this issue in more
detail in section 5.
<table 1 here>
It is well-known that the U.S. oil industry generally exhibits a high degree
of vertical integration. In the 1970s Blair (1976, 236) already noted:
“[...] the oil industry has developed a pattern of vertical inte-
gration [...] that is unapproached by any other industry.”
In fact, table 2 shows that a large proportion of the refineries operating in
1995 is either fully or partially vertically integrated, i.e. most refineries are
integrated backwards into crude oil production or forwards into gasoline re-
tailing (or both). Yet, there remains a nonnegligable number of independent
refineries, which is crucial for directly estimating downstream foreclosure in
gasoline retailing.
<table 2 here>
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As pointed out above, our framework is based on a careful analysis of
the strategic incentives of vertically integrated refineries. Apart from the
advantage of directly measuring foreclosure, this framework dispenses with
the need to have micro data on gasoline retailing, as will become clear in
the discussion of our theoretical setup. That is, evaluating the competitive
eﬀects of the integration of gasoline refiners and retailers exclusively relies
almost exclusively on data on the refining stage of the industry. Yet, to
derive the supply relation of a refining firm, we need to have a clear view of
the working of retail competition. We shall outline this argument in the next
section in which we construct our theoretical setup.
3 Theoretical Setup
In this section, we set up a simple model of vertically related oligopolies that
captures the essential features of the refining industry described in section
2. The theoretical setup presented here comes close to that in Gilbert and
Hastings (2001). In contrast to their contribution, we assume that costs of
refining crude oil are non-zero.
3.1 Assumptions
For simplicity, we focus on the gasoline refining and retailing stages of the in-
dustry.10 More specifically, we consider an upstream market where refineries
sell gasoline on a wholesale market, and a downstream market where retailers
distribute gasoline to final customers.
We model the provision of gasoline to final customers as a two-stage
game. In the first stage, n refining firms simultaneously choose the gasoline
outputs qwi , i = 1, ...n, that they are willing to sell on the wholesale market,
taking the wholesale outputs of the other refineries as given. In the second
stage, m retailing firms set their retail prices prj , j = 1, ...,m, taking as given
10We first explicitly incorporated the crude oil production stage in our theoretical model.
This, however, complicates the notation of the cost function to be discussed below, but
does not enrich the theoretical setup. For this reason, we omit the oil production stage in
our theoretical analysis. However, we will control for the ownership structure in crude oil
production in our empirical analysis.
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each other’s retail price as well as the wholesale price Pw, where Pw =
Pw(Qw), Qw =
Pn
i=1 qwi , and ∂Pw(Qw)/∂Qw < 0. It should be noted that a
vertically integrated refinery i not only sells qwi on the wholesale market, but
also produces the amount qri for its own retail outlet. We assume here that
each integrated refining plant has suﬃcient capacity to fully cover its own
retailer’s demand. Thus, vertically integrated outlets do not purchase from
the wholesale gasoline market as will be outlined formally below.
In our theoretical setup, we maintain the following basic assumptions:
(A1) Refineries produce a homogeneous product and act as Cournot-Nash
competitors.
(A2) Retailers produce diﬀerentiated products and act as price setters. They
face a well-defined demand function qrj (pr) for each vector of retail
prices pr = (pr1, ..., prm).
(A3) One unit of the upstream product is required to produce one unit of
the downstream product.
Assumption (A1) is motivated by our above description of the industry.
Product diﬀerentiation in assumption (A2) rests on the findings of the em-
pirical literature on competition on retail gasoline markets. This literature
suggest that retailing firms earn positive markups thanks to product diﬀer-
entiation or tacit collusion (Shepard 1990; Borenstein 1991; Shepard 1991;
Borenstein and Shepard 1996; Borenstein et al. 1997; Borenstein and Shep-
ard 2002). The assumption of a well-defined demand function qrj for each
retailer implies that there exists a rationing rule which determines retailers’
profit functions in case aggregate downstream demand exceeds the upstream
capacity constraint. (A3) is a standard assumption of the literature on verti-
cally related markets. We believe it is adequate in the context of the supply
of refined gasoline, where one gallon of refined retail gasoline requires one
gallon of refined wholesale gasoline.
We solve the model by backwards induction. That is, we first solve for the
equilibrium vector of retail prices pr = (pr1, ..., prm) at the gasoline stage. Fur-
ther, since the equilibrium retail price vector depends on the wholesale price,
which is taken as given at this stage, we can write it as pr = pr (Pw (Qw)) .
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At the first stage of the game, refineries choose their quantities taking into
account the optimal price choice pr = pr (Pw (Qw)) of the retailers.
3.2 Deriving the Supply Relation
Let us now consider how a refining firm chooses its wholesale output qwi . The
profit function of refining firm i is given by
πi = Pw(Qw)qwi +Rri (pr(Pw(Qw)))− Ci(qwi , qri (pr(Pw(Qw)))), (1)
where Pw(Qw)qwi is the wholesale revenue, Rri (pr(Pw(Qw))) is the retail rev-
enue, and Ci(·) is the cost function, which is nondecreasing in qwi and qri .
Note that, by definition, qri ≡ Rri ≡ 0 if refining firm i is vertically separated,
i.e. not active in the downstream market.
In Cournot-Nash equilibrium, refining firm i chooses its wholesale output
qwi such that
∂πi
∂qwi
= Pw(Qw) + ∂P
w(Qw)
∂qwi
qwi +
X
j
∂Rri
∂prj
∂prj
∂Pw
∂Pw
∂Qw
− ∂Ci(q
w
i , qri (·))
∂qwi
− ∂Ci(q
w
i , qri (·))
∂qri
ÃX
j
∂qri
∂prj
∂prj
∂Pw
∂Pw
∂Qw
!
= 0. (2)
Rearranging (2) yields an adapted version of the well-known first-order con-
dition of a Cournot oligopolist
Pw(Qw)
·
1 +
swi
εw
¸
=
∂Ci(qwi , qri (·))
∂qwi
+ Fi(qwi , qri ), (3)
where swi = qwi /Qw is refinery i’s market share in the wholesale market, εw is
the price elasticity of demand in the wholesale market, and Fi(qwi , qri ) is the
foreclosure term defined as
Fi(qwi , qri ) ≡
∂Ci(qwi , qri (·))
∂qri
ÃX
j
∂qri
∂prj
∂prj
∂Pw
∂Pw
∂Qw
!
| {z }
cost eﬀect
−
X
j
∂Rri
∂prj
∂prj
∂Pw
∂Pw
∂Qw| {z }
revenue eﬀect
, (4)
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where ∂qri /∂pri < 0, ∂qri /∂prj > 0 for all j 6= i, ∂Rri /∂prj > 0 for all j 6=
i, ∂Rri /∂pri < 0, and ∂prj/∂Pw > 0 for all j. The first three derivatives re-
flect standard assumptions on demand functions with substitutes, the fourth
derivative follows from firm i’s first-order condition for its retail price pri ,
and the last is a standard equilibrium result for competition with strategic
complements.
To understand (3), it is helpful to highlight the diﬀerences to the standard
first-order condition of a Cournot oligopolist. First, it should be noted that
if the refining firm under consideration is vertically separated, Fi(qwi , 0) = 0.
This follows immediately from qri = Rri ≡ 0. That is, a vertically separated
refining firm is expected to set the standard Cournot output. Now, consider a
vertically integrated firm. The revenue eﬀect in (4) indicates that a vertically
integrated refinery may have an incentive to strategically reduce its wholesale
output qwi so as to increase its downstream revenue Rri . The intuition of this
eﬀect is straightforward: A reduction of the wholesale output qwi increases
the wholesale price Pw, which raises independent downstream rivals’ costs,
forcing them to increase their retail prices. If refinery i’s retail price pri does
not increase too much in response to the change of the wholesale price Pw,
downstream revenue Rri will go up. The additional cost eﬀect incorporated in
Fi(qwi , qri ) arises since the integrated refinery optimally adjusts the quantity
qri in response to changes in retail prices. More specifically, a reduction of
the wholesale output qwi leads to an increase in the wholesale price Pw which
induces the separated retailers to raise their retail prizes prj . Thanks to higher
prices posted by its competitors, the vertically integrated retailer enjoys an
increased own demand qri which is met by increasing production upstream.
The profitability of a strategic reduction of qwi is ambiguous in general,
since the sign of Fi(qwi , qri ) depends simultaneously on the sign of the revenue
eﬀect and the cost eﬀect. Nevertheless, first-order condition (3) provides us
with a convenient way of testing whether vertical foreclosure is profitable in
equilibrium for an integrated refining firm i. Fi(qwi , qri ) > 0 implies that it
pays to strategically reduce the wholesale output qwi relative to the standard
Cournot output, since the additional downstream revenues are larger than
the associated cost distortions. For Fi(qwi , qri ) < 0 the argument runs vice
versa. Therefore, first-order condition (3) indicates that a strategic reduction
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of qwi –i.e. raising rivals’ costs–is profitable in equilibrium if and only if
Fi(qwi , qri ) > 0. This provides us with a simple way of testing whether vertical
foreclosure is profitable for any given integrated firm i: All we need to do is
check the sign of Fi(qwi , qri ). For the empirical analysis of U.S. gasoline supply,
we establish the hypothesis that vertical foreclosure arises in equilibrium, i.e.
Fi(qwi , qri ) > 0, and test for it.
As discussed at the outset, vertical integration not only brings about
the danger of foreclosure, but also the potential for realizing eﬃciencies. In
fact, vertically integrating firms invariably claim that their merger increases
eﬃciency. First-order condition (3) accounts for this possibility in two ways.
First, each refining firm i is associated with an individual marginal cost
function ∂Ci(·)/∂qwi , i.e. there is room for generic cost diﬀerences between
firms, whether they are integrated or not. Second, since the retail output of a
vertically separated refinery is zero by definition (qri ≡ 0), the marginal cost
function of refining firm i is evaluated at diﬀerent arguments under vertical
integration and separation. That is, the model presented in this section
allows for synergies between refining and retailing that are unrelated to the
potential savings of fixed costs.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we specify an empirical model of the gasoline refining industry
that allows us to evaluate the competitive eﬀects of the vertical integration
of gasoline refineries and retailers. Broadly speaking, we follow the “New
Empirical Industrial Organization” (NEIO) literature which suggests that,
in oligopolistic markets, conduct and unknown cost parameters may be in-
ferred from the responsiveness of prices to changes in demand elasticities and
various known cost parameters.11 In practice, this amounts to identifying and
estimating a set of simultaneous equations–typically a demand function and
a supply relation–that are assumed to characterize the equilibrium of the
oligopolistic market under consideration. Yet, in contrast to many NEIO
11See Bresnahan (1989) for a survey. Genesove and Mullin (1998) provide evidence for
the validity of the NEIO methodology in the static oligopoly case. Corts (1999) provides
a critical review for dynamic models.
12
studies, we do not attempt to estimate the (horizontal) “average collusive-
ness of conduct” or the “intensity of competition”, but the refining firms’
(vertical) strategic behavior with respect to independent retailers under the
hypothesis that foreclosure is present in that industry. Recall that, accord-
ing to assumption (A1), refining firms act as Cournot-Nash competitors.
By making this assumption, we thus exogenously determine the intensity of
competition on the wholesale market.12
4.1 Specification of the Supply Relation
The point of departure for constructing the refining industry’s empirical sup-
ply relation is the theoretical first-order condition given in (3). Rearranging
yields
Pw = −s
w
i
εwP
w +
∂Ci(qwi , qri )
∂qwi
+ Fi(qwi , qri ). (5)
We go through five steps of specification to fully parameterize this equation.
First, to quantify the foreclosure eﬀect, it is natural to introduce a dummy
variable di, which is one for integrated refining firms and zero for others. How-
ever, the drawback of estimating the foreclosure eﬀect with a single dummy
variable is that possible size-induced diﬀerences in the refining firms’ incen-
tives to foreclosure independent retailers are ignored. To account for such
diﬀerences, we interact the dummy variable di with three additional firm size
dummies, s(t)i , t = 2, 3, 4, that indicate to which quartile in the distribution
of market shares firm i belongs.13 For instance, s(2)i equals one if the market
share of firm i is in the second quartile, and is zero otherwise, etc. This
specification allows the foreclosure eﬀect to vary nonlinearly over firm sizes.
We call the respective interaction terms foreclose_s for firms with small mar-
ket shares (in the second quartile), foreclose_m for firms with medium-sized
market shares (third quartile), and foreclose_l for firms with large market
12Note that, in principle, it is straightforward to incorporate the average collusiveness of
conduct on the upstream market into our general framework. However, the identification
of the supply relation’s relevant parameters then becomes more complicated.
13Defining the market share as the ratio si = qi/Q of its refining capacity to the aggre-
gate refining capacity, we calculated this ratio for each firm and constructed the quartiles
based on the nation-wide distribution of market shares.
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shares (fourth quartile).
Second, to quantify the eﬃciency eﬀect, we use the interaction term eﬃ-
ciency ≡ di×qi,k, where qi,k denotes the refining capacity of plant k belonging
to firm i. The interaction term is intended to control for cost diﬀerences be-
tween otherwise identical vertically separated and integrated refining plants.
Note that this specification allows integration economies to emerge at the
plant rather than the firm level (see Masseron 1990, pp. 284). Measuring
the eﬃciency eﬀect at the plant level is crucial for empirically separating the
eﬃciency from the foreclosure eﬀect, which is measured at the firm level. Em-
ploying this specification, the correlation of the respective interaction terms
turns out to be fairly low (0.07, 0.25, and 0.47, respectively).
Clearly, estimating the first-order condition of a refining firm using plant
level data is not quite satisfying from a theoretical point of view for firms
owning multiple plants. To control for this shortcoming, we introduce the
dummy variable nplant, which is one for a firm owning multiple plants and
zero otherwise.
Third, in specifying marginal costs, we add five diﬀerent groups of vari-
ables to construct the vector xi,k of additional explanatory variables: (i) cost
variables, such as wages and other factor prices; (ii) refinery characteristics,
such as plant age and the type of crude oil processed measured in gravity; (iii)
firm characteristics, e.g. whether a firm is a major U.S. company or a major
international company etc.; (iv) variables describing a firm’s vertical relation
to crude oil production, e.g. whether it owns foreign wells, or is backwards
integrated, and (v) other control variables, e.g. whether the information on
a firm’s ownership structure was gathered on the internet.
Fourth, since gasoline is homogeneous within the three grades, as stated
above, there is a generic lack of variance for the dependent variable Pw.
To deal with this problem, we use the wholesale gasoline prices of three
independent regional submarkets. In each of these independent submarkets,
the refining firms are assumed to act as Cournot-Nash competitors. The
submarkets–we henceforth call them “regions”–are defined as the following
combinations of PAD districts:
• region 1: PAD districts 1 and 3;
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• region 2: PAD districts 2;
• region 3: PAD districts 4 and 5.
The construction of these regions follows primarily from the pattern of
petroleum trade across PAD districts. The data on the movement of petro-
leum products provided by the Energy Information Administration (1996b,
tables 12 and 32) indicate that there is considerable trade between PAD dis-
tricts 1 and 3, whereas the trade between PAD district 2 and other districts
is very limited. It is thus natural to classify PAD districts 1 and 3, as well as
district 2, as regions of their own. The picture is less clear for PAD districts 4
and 5. They could also be treated as regions of their own on the basis of the
petroleum movement data. We nevertheless aggregate them to form region
3, since (with the exception of New Mexico) these two districts are identical
to the Census-region “West”, which is an important retail market defined by
the U.S. Census Bureau. In regions 1 and 3, we use the mean of the respec-
tive PAD district prices reported by the Energy Information Administration
(1996a).
The theoretical setup outlined in section 3 suggests that in each of these
independent submarkets, first-order condition (5) must be satisfied for any
active refining firm. Further, it is natural to assume that, besides choos-
ing output, a firm may also choose the location of its plant(s). That is,
even though we do not explicitly analyze the choice of a plant’s location, we
account for the fact that each of the refining firms may choose any of the
submarkets considered as a plant’s location. That is, the wholesale price is
allowed to vary over the diﬀerent plants. We therefore write the wholesale
price as Pwk .
Fifth, since the wholesale market share swi is not observable, we treat it
as a parameter to estimate and therefore denote it by σi. Now consider the
wholesale price elasticity εw. It is well-known that, in general, the upstream
price elasticity εw may be expressed in terms of the (aggregate) downstream
price elasticity εr times the elasticity e of the (aggregate) downstream price
with respect to changes of the upstream price (Rey and Stiglitz 1995; Slade
1998). That is, for a given downstream price elasticity εr and a set of prices
Pw and P r, the simplest parameterization of the wholesale price elasticity is
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given by
εw = f(εr, Pw, P r; θ) = εr × e ≡ εrθP
w
P r , (6)
with θ ≡ ∂P r/∂Pw. Employing this linear specification of e and adding an
error term ξk with E [ξk] = 0 yields the empirical supply relation
Pwk = α1 −
σk
θkεr
P r +
X
h∈{s,m,l}
αh × foreclose_hi (7)
+α2 × eﬃciencyk + β0xi,k + γ × nplantk + ξk,
where the greek letters are the parameters to be estimated. Clearly, the
parameters σi, θk and εr are not identified. This is inconsequential, however,
for estimating the parameters of the foreclosure and the eﬃciency eﬀect,
which are of immediate interest.
Under the hypothesis that vertical foreclosure is an equilibrium strategy
for vertically integrated firms, we expect αh, h = s,m, l, to be positive, which
is equivalent to Fi (qri , qwi ) > 0 in the theoretical setup. Further, under the
hypothesis that there are eﬃciency gains which are increasing in plant size,
we expect the sign of the coeﬃcient α2 to be negative. Finally, we expect
the coeﬃcient − σkθkεr to be positive.
4.2 Identification and Estimation
When estimating supply relation (7), one has to bear in mind that a number
of the explanatory variables are endogenous. For instance, we treat the retail
price as endogenous. The prices of crude oil and natural gas liquids, which are
important inputs for the refining process, are treated as further endogenous
variables. Although, for simplicity, the uppermost layer in the vertical supply
chain is not included in our theoretical setup, we acknowledge that the prices
for these products are simultaneously determined.14 Similarly, quantities are
treated as endogenous because of the familiar simultaneity bias, even though
the demand side is not explicitly incorporated here. Since the interaction
terms are functions of quantities, they are viewed as endogenous. Finally, we
14Recall that more than two thirds of the refining firms in our sample are integrated
backwards into production (see table 2)
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treat any variable that deals with location or plant number as endogenous in
our empirical specification. In particular, we assume that nplant is correlated
with the error term.
Our key identification assumption concerns the choice of instrumental
variables. Any variables that are correlated with the endogenous explanatory
variables, but uncorrelated with the error term ξk, are appropriate instru-
ments. We use two diﬀerent sets of instrumental variables, denoted by A and
B, respectively.
Instrument set A contains the exogenous explanatory variables (including
the constant) plus further exogenous variables from the supply side of the
market, in particular firm characteristics and variables describing the crude
oil production segment of the industry, such as the share of crude oil imports
in a PAD district. In total, there are 23 instruments in set A.
Instrument set B, in turn, includes all variables of instrument set A, plus
the squares and interaction terms of the continuous exogenous explanatory
variables. The total number of instruments in set B is 88.15
The number of instruments in both sets easily outnumbers the maxi-
mum number of parameters to be estimated. We therefore employ over-
identification tests to avoid specification errors.
To construct a benchmark for our estimation results, we first estimate
the supply relation using OLS, ignoring the endogeneity problem, but using
the White heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator (White
1980). We then use the GMM estimator proposed by Hansen (1982) to
estimate the model parameters. This estimator exploits population moment
conditions and provides both consistent parameter estimates and standard
errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity.
4.3 Data
In this section, we briefly describe our data sources as well as their use in
the present study. A detailed description of our variables and the summary
statistics, is given in the appendix (tables A2 and A3, respectively).
15See table A1 in the appendix for a detailed list of the variables in instrument sets A
and B.
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The main data source for our analysis is the report “Entry and Exit in
U.S. Petroleum Refining 1948-1995” compiled by the American Petroleum
Institute (1996). It provides detailed data on the ownership and capacity
histories of petroleum refineries operating in the U.S. from January 1948
through January 1995. In particular, it identifies the location and the own-
ership of all 159 refineries operating positive capacities in 1995 at the parent
company level.
Using the “U.S.A. Oil Industry Directory 1995” edited by Pennwell (1995),
we determined the vertical structure of the refining firms listed in the Amer-
ican Petroleum Institute’s (1996) report. For the small number of refining
firms that are not listed in the Pennwell (1995) directory, we used informa-
tion gathered from the internet to determine the vertical structure. For three
firms in the data set, we were unable to determine the vertical structure, and
we therefore excluded them from our sample. For eight of the 156 remaining
refineries, the age of the refining plant is not reported in the American Pe-
troleum Institute’s (1996) report. We thus ended up with 148 observations
for our estimations.
The Oil Industry Directory further provides useful information on firm
characteristics, e.g. whether the firm is a major U.S. company, a major
international company, owned by a foreign company, etc. We used this in-
formation to construct our instrument sets.
Two reports prepared by the Energy Information Agency (1996a,b), the
“Petroleum Marketing Annual 1995”, and the “Petroleum Supply Annual
1995”, provide detailed information on the aggregate wholesale and retail
prices of gasoline per state and PAD district, as well as the pattern of cross-
district trade and the type of crude oil processed in the various refining
districts. We used them to construct our three regional wholesale and retail
markets, the associated price and quantity variables, and a number of refinery
characteristics variables.
Finally, we used data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2000)
for the relevant wages of refinery operators, and general and operations man-
agers. This data was supplemented by the natural gas price for the industrial
sector provided by the Energy Information Administration’s (2001) report
“Natural Gas 2000”.
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5 Results and Interpretation
This section presents our estimates of the U.S. refining industry’s average
supply relation in 1995. First, we report the estimation results for equation
(7). Second, we discuss the robustness of these results, employing various
alternative specifications of the average supply relation. Third, we use our
parameter estimates to derive statements about the relative importance of
the foreclosure and eﬃciency eﬀect associated with vertical integration into
gasoline retailing. Finally, we analyze the impact of the foreclosure eﬀect on
the level of wholesale prices.
5.1 Estimated Supply Relation
Table 3 reports the estimates for equation (7). Column (I) lists the OLS
estimates which account for heteroscedasticity but ignore the endogeneity
problem. They serve as a benchmark for the GMM estimates reported in
columns (II) and (III), using instrument sets A and B, respectively. The
table is divided into four groups of coeﬃcient estimates: The first group
contains the variables of immediate interest, including the retail price, the
three foreclosure interaction terms and the eﬃciency interaction term. The
second group contains various variables describing the refineries’ input mar-
kets, such as factor prices and imports of crude oil. The third group controls
for the specific characteristics of a plant or a refining firm. The last group
contains miscellaneous variables. In the following, we shall primarily discuss
the coeﬃcient estimates of the first group.
<table 3 here>
To begin with, consider the OLS estimates. Even though the coeﬃcient
estimates are biased and inconsistent, they are in line with our above hypoth-
esis that vertical integration generates both foreclosure and eﬃciency eﬀects.
For instance, the coeﬃcients of the variables foreclose_m and foreclose_l are
both positive and significant, whereas the coeﬃcient of foreclose_s is nega-
tive and insignificant. These estimates suggest that a refining firm’s incentive
to foreclose independent downstream rivals does increase with its size. Fur-
ther, the coeﬃcient of eﬃciency is negative and significant. That is, we find
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preliminary evidence for both vertical foreclosure and integration economies.
The input variables are found to have the expected impact on marginal costs.
All factor prices enter positively into the equation, and backwards integration
into crude oil production appears to reduce marginal costs. High crude oil
imports also tend to reduce the wholesale price of refined gasoline. Finally,
the coeﬃcients of the various plant and firm characteristics are consistent
with basic economic intuition.
Now consider the GMM estimates reported in column (II), which are
based on instrument set A. The coeﬃcient estimates deviate considerably
from the OLS estimates in column (I). More specifically, the signs of various
coeﬃcients change, and the standard errors generally increase dramatically.
In fact, the only variable found to be significant is the retail price, and the
adjusted R2 drops to 0.80. It should be pointed out, however, that such
eﬀects are commonly observed when changing from OLS to an instrumental
variable (IV) estimator. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, 224), for instance,
note that IV estimators may be extremely ineﬃcient, and the finite-sample
distributions may be very diﬀerent from the asymptotic ones, especially when
the instruments have little ability to explain the endogenous regressors. To
deal with the latter problem, we used the more comprehensive instrument
set B to estimate the supply relation.
The GMM estimates reported in Column (III) are based on instrument set
B. The χ2 statistic indicates that the null hypothesis of no overidentification
cannot be rejected. Note that the standard errors are considerably reduced
relative to column (II), and with the exception of foreclose_s, all variables of
immediate interest are significant. The coeﬃcient estimates of the foreclosure
terms again indicate that the incentives to foreclose independent retailers
increase with size. More specifically, large integrated refining firms (in terms
of market shares) have a stronger incentive to foreclose independent retailers
than small integrated refining firms. Similarly, the eﬃciency eﬀect is found to
increase with refinery size. Furthermore, all input prices have the expected
positive signs and are significant. The negative coeﬃcient of back indicates
that there are significant economies of backwards integration into crude oil
production. Also, a high crude oil import share tends to reduce the wholesale
price, which is clearly in line with basic economic intuition. There is only
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one important diﬀerence to the OLS results: When estimating with GMM,
the coeﬃcients of the foreclosure and the eﬃciency variables tend to become
larger in absolute value, i.e., once we account for the endogeneity problem,
the competitive eﬀects of vertical integration become more pronounced. This
finding may be explained by the familiar simultaneity-bias of OLS.
5.2 Robustness and Alternative Specifications
We estimated a number of alternative model specifications to check the ro-
bustness of the results reported in table 3. More specifically, we used al-
ternative parameterizations of the unobservable wholesale market share swi ,
experimented with a diﬀerent set of regional submarkets, and employed other
specifications of marginal costs. We discuss each of these changes in specifi-
cation in turn.
One way of dealing with the non-observability of wholesale market shares
entails using the mean of wholesale market shares s¯w = 1n
P
i swi = 1n to es-
timate an adapted version of (7) where n denotes the (observable) number
of refining firms active in a submarket. Instead of the retail price, one can
then use the wholesale price divided by the number of refining firms active
in this submarket as a regressor, with the wholesale price elasticity εw being
identified immediately. A serious disadvantage of this specification, however,
is the elimination of the retail price from the estimation equation. That is,
readily available information on the working of oligopolistic competition in
the vertically related refining industry is discarded.16 It is thus unsurpris-
ing that equation (7) turns out to provide a better fit to the data. More
disturbingly, the wholesale price elasticity is estimated to be positive rather
than negative with this particular specification. Nevertheless, the qualita-
tive results for the foreclosure and the eﬃciency eﬀects are similar for both
specifications.
A casual way of dealing with the non-observability of wholesale market
shares involves simply using a refinery’s relative capacity si = qi/Q instead
of swi . One can then use the wholesale price multiplied by si to estimate the
16In fact, the refining industry is treated as a standard horizontal industry in terms of
pricing.
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average supply relation, i.e., the retail price is again eliminated from the es-
timation equation. The estimates then turn out to be similar to those just
mentioned. It should be noted, however, that in addition to the problems
discussed above, using si instead of swi introduces a measurement error prob-
lem that makes it impossible to find instruments for the wholesale price, since
the error term is a function of the wholesale price by construction.
In addition, we estimated equation (7) using a diﬀerent set of regional
submarkets, where the PAD districts 4 and 5 were treated as two distinct
regions (rather than one aggregated region). This change in the definition of
independent regional submarkets did not aﬀect the qualitative results of our
analysis. We also introduced alternative specifications of marginal costs. In
particular, we employed the additional variables qi,k and q2i,k, which turned
out to be insignificant. We are aware that this specification might have intro-
duced a multicollinearity problem, since the correlation of qi,k and eﬃciency
is very high (the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.92). Unsurprisingly, the eﬃciency
benefit of integration was estimated to be insignificant with this particular
specification. Finally, we rescaled the eﬃciency interaction term to avoid po-
tential numerical problems when estimating equation (7). Yet, the numerical
estimates were largely unaﬀected by this transformation.
In the next section, we shall therefore use the GMM estimates reported
in column (III) of table 3 for our analysis of the role that strategic vertical
foreclosure plays in the U.S. refining industry.
5.3 Quantifying the Foreclosure Eﬀect
We have pointed out above that both the incentives to foreclose independent
retailers and the eﬃciency benefits of integration increase with size. As a
result, it is generally ambiguous whether the foreclosure eﬀect dominates
the eﬃciency eﬀect associated with vertical integration. Using our GMM
estimates of the average supply relation reported in column (III) of table
3, we now calculate the regional share of integrated refining firms for which
the strategic incentive to foreclose independent retailers is larger than the
eﬃciency benefit of vertical integration.
First, for each quartile t = 2, ..., 4, we calculate the critical firm size
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q∗(t), below which the foreclosure eﬀect dominates the eﬃciency benefit.17
Second, we determine the number of integrated firms n˜(t) that are smaller
than this critical value and compare it to the total number of firms n(t) in
the respective quartile. Note that the calculation of n˜(t)/n(t) is entirely a
ceteris paribus exercise, i.e., alternative factors determining the pricing rule
are held constant when carrying out these calculations. Table 4 reports the
results of this exercise.
<table 4 here>
Strikingly, table 4 indicates that the foreclosure eﬀect dominates the ef-
ficiency eﬀect for more than half of the refining firms in the sample. The
share of refining firms for which the foreclosure eﬀect associated with inte-
gration dominates the eﬃciency eﬀect varies considerably over the regional
submarkets: While the foreclosure eﬀect dominates for merely 21% of the re-
fining firms in the East and Golf Coast region, it dominates for almost 90%
of the firms in the Rocky Mountains and West Coast region. Similarly, the
foreclosure eﬀect dominates for none of the small firms with market shares in
the second quartile, but for almost all of the large firms with market shares
n the fourth quartile. That is, a refining firm with a large regional market
share–rather than a firm with large absolute capacity–has strong incentives
to foreclose independent downstream rivals.
To quantify the impact of the foreclosure eﬀect on the wholesale price, it
is instructive to compare the observed wholesale price Pw with the wholesale
price P˜w predicted by the model in the absence of foreclosure (see table 5).18
<table 5 here>
Table 5 indicates that in the Midwest (region 2) as well as the Rocky
Mountains and the West Coast (region 3), where vertical foreclosure is prac-
ticed extensively, the wholesale price is increased by roughly 0.5 cents per
17As an example, consider the critical firm size q∗(t) for a refining firm with a market
share si in the fourth quartile (t = 4). The critical firm size is calculated by solving the
equation 0.814− 1.07× 10−6q∗(4) = 0. The solution is given by q∗(4) = 760, 750 barrels
per calender day.
18To calculate P˜w, we evaluated the model at the means of the explaining variables,
setting the foreclosure terms equal to zero.
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gallon. In the East and Gulf Coast region (region 1), in turn, where half of
the medium-sized and none of the large firms appear to practice foreclosure,
the predicted price eﬀect of vertical foreclosure is somewhat lower (0.2 cents
per gallon). That is, even though a majority of the refining firms in the
sample are practicing vertical foreclosure, the overall price eﬀect of foreclo-
sure is relatively small. One should keep in mind, however, that even such
relatively modest price increases may be able to generate considerable rents
for integrated refining firms.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a novel framework for evaluating the com-
petitive eﬀects of the vertical integration of gasoline refineries and retailers.
Our framework is based on the insight that to examine strategic foreclosure
on the retail market, one must study the vertically integrated firms’ strategic
behavior on the wholesale market. Applying this simple rationale, we analyze
the supply of gasoline in the U.S. More specifically, we estimate the petro-
leum refining industry’s supply relation in 1995 and derive statements about
the competitive eﬀects of vertical integration from the coeﬃcient estimates.
The parameter estimates turn out to be in line with the predictions of
the theoretical literature and basic economic intuition. We find significant
evidence that both foreclosure and eﬃciency eﬀects are associated with ver-
tical integration. Strikingly, our estimates also suggest that the foreclosure
eﬀect dominates the eﬃciency eﬀect for more than half of the refining firms
in the U.S. The overall price eﬀect of vertical foreclosure is estimated to be
0.2 to 0.6 cents per gallon.
There are two natural extensions to our analysis. First, note that the
dominating foreclosure eﬀect for more than half of the integrated firms may
suggest that vertical integration generates adverse welfare eﬀects. Yet, such
a conclusion would be hasty, since the net eﬀect of the refining firms’ strate-
gic behavior on the set of retail prices is generally undetermined. It would
thus be interesting to estimate the eﬀect that strategic manipulations of the
wholesale price have on the prices set by individual retailers. One could
then derive statements about the welfare eﬀects of vertical mergers. Second,
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one could follow another branch of the NEIO literature and treat the inten-
sity of competition on the wholesale market as a variable to be estimated,
rather than imposing a particular level of intensity by assuming Cournot
competition. By doing this, one could check whether the set of assumptions
suggested by the special characteristics of the refining industry is supported
by econometric evidence.
Appendix
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Table A1: List of Instruments
Instrument set A Instrument set B
Exogenous Explaining Variables Exogenous Explaining Variables
w_rop w_rop
w_gm w_gm
crud_imp crud_imp
ref_age ref_age
gravity gravity
foreign foreign
coop coop
conglom conglom
maj_int maj_usa
maj_usa maj_int
internet internet
constant constant
Further Exogneous Variables Further Exogneous Variables
w_purch w_purch
w_indeng w_indeng
w_mandr w_mandr
p_coal p_coal
crud_stk crud_stk
statenum statenum
padd padd
other other
frgnwell frgnwell
sulfur sulfur
ca ca
Squares and Interaction Terms of
Continous Exogenous Variables
w_rop
w_gm
w_purch
w_indeng
w_mandr
p_elect
year_own
age
sulfur
gravity
Total # of Instruments
23 88
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Table A2: Definition and Source of Variables
Variable Definition
Dependent Variable
Pwk State refiner motor gasoline price for Petroleum Marketing A
all grades, sales for resale (in cents per gallon)
Competitive Eﬀects
di =1, if the owner of the plant is downstream Oil Industry Directory
integrated
s(t)i =1, if the firm’s regional market share Entry and Exit in U.S
si = qi/Q is in the tth quartile of the
national distribution of market shares
foreclose_s ≡ di × s(2)i =1, if si is in the 2nd quartile of market shares
foreclose_m ≡ di × s(3)i =1, if si is in the 3rd quartile of market share
foreclose_l ≡ di × s(4)i =1, if si is in the 4th quartile of market shares
back =1, if the owner of the plant is backwards Oil Industry Directory
integrated
qi,k Refining plant capacity (in thousand barrels Entry and Exit in U.S
per calendar day)
eﬃciency ≡ di × qi,k integration economies (at plant level)
Cost Variables
w_rop State median hourly wage estimates State Occupational Em
for refinery operators
w_gm State median hourly wage estimates State Occupational Em
for general and operations managers
w_purch State median hourly wage estimates State Occupational Em
for purchasing managers
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Table A2 (continued): Definition and Source of Variables
Variable Definition
w_indeng State median hourly wage estimates State Occ
for industrial engineers
w_mandr State median hourly wage estimates State Occ
for maintenance and repair workers
p_crude Domestic crude oil first purchase price Petroleum
by API gravity (dollars per barrel)
p_ngas Average state price of natural gas delivered to Natural G
industrial sector (dollars per thousand cubic feet)
p_coal Average price of coal delivered to electric utilities Coal Indu
by census division (dollars per short ton)
p_elect Electric Utility Average Revenue per Monthly E
Kilowatthour to Industrial Sector (in cents) Revenue R
Refinery Characteristics
year_own Number of years the refining plant is owned by Entry and
the firm
ref_age Age of the refining plant Entry and
sulfur Refining district weighted average of sulfur content Petroleum
in crude oil (in percent)
gravity Refining district weighted average of API gravity Petroleum
of crude oil (in degrees)
statenum Categorical variable which assigns to each plant the Entry and
number associated with the state where it operates
padd Categorical variable which assigns to each plant the Entry and
number associated with the PAD district where it operates
ca =1, if the refining plant is located in the Entry and
state of California
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Table A2 (continued): Definition and Source of Variables
Variable Definition
Firm Characteristics
foreign =1, if the refining plant is owned by a foreign Oil Industry Dire
company
coop =1, if the refining plant is owned by a cooperative Oil Industry Dire
conglom =1, if the refining plant is owned by a conglomerate Oil Industry Dire
company (Solomon or USX/Marathon)
maj_usa =1, if the refining plant is owned by a major US oil Oil Industry Dire
company (Amoco, ARCO, Esso, Chevron, Phillips,
Sun, Texaco, USX/Marathon, Unocal)
maj_int =1, if the refining plant is owned by a “seven sisters” Oil Industry Dire
company (BP, Esso, Chevron, Mobil, Shell, Texaco)
nplant =1, if a refining firm owns multiple plants in a region Entry and Exit in
Crude Oil Production
crud_imp PAD district net import share of fully available Petroleum Annua
crude oil in that region
crud_stk PAD district stock share of fully available Petroleum Annua
crude oil in that region
frgnwell =1, if the owner of the plant owns oil wells abroad Oil Industry Dire
Miscellaneous
other =1, if the owner of the plant’s main revenues Oil Industry Dire
accrue from sales of alternative petroleum products
internet =1, if information on the ownership structure Internet
is gathered on the internet
ca =1, if refining plant is located in California Entry and Exit in
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Table A3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable
Pwk 62.708 3.155 59.900 67.150
Competitive Eﬀects
di 0.75 0.434 0 1
foreclose_s ≡ di × s(2)i 0.176 0.382 0 1
foreclose_m ≡ di × s(3)i 0.209 0.408 0 1
foreclose_l ≡ di × s(4)i 0.270 0.446 0 1
back 0.615 0.488 0 1
qi,k 98599.190 93566.35 1000 433000
eﬃciency ≡ di × qi,k 85839.29 97467.22 0 433000
Cost Variables
w_rop 19.271 2.574 11.924 26.669
w_gm 25.202 5.515 16.606 43.278
w_purch 21.414 3.558 14.454 30.206
w_indeng 25.392 2.293 19.142 30.700
w_mandr 11.648 1.658 9.194 16.263
p_crudoil 14.980 2.144 11.140 16.240
p_ngas 4.068 0.950 1.326 8.931
p_coal 23.011 4.768 15.063 35.582
p_elect 4.161 1.000 2.722 9.835
Refinery Characteristics
year_own 25.162 16.665 1 48
ref_age 41.081 12.043 3 48
sulfur 1.141 0.261 0.560 1.760
gravity 31.553 4.026 25.510 39.160
Firm Characteristics
foreign 0.135 0.343 0 1
coop 0.027 0.163 0 1
conglom 0.047 0.213 0 1
maj_usa 0.291 0.456 0 1
maj_inter 0.189 0.393 0 1
nplant 0.507 0.502 0 1
Crude Oil Production
crud_imp 0.469 0.291 0.088 1.000
crud_stk 0.064 0.018 0.022 0.086
frgnwell 0.581 0.495 0 1
Miscellaneous
other 0.149 0.357 0 1
internet 0.223 0.418 0 1
ca 0.149 0.357 0 1
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Table 1: Horizontal Structure (Number of Refineries)
PAD district
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Capacity* East Coast Midwest Gulf Coast Rocky Mnts West Coast
0 < 100 6 21 29 14 23 93
100 < 200 4 7 13 0 9 33
200 < 300 2 3 8 0 3 16
300 < 400 0 0 3 0 0 3
400 < 500 0 1 2 0 0 3
Total 12 32 55 14 35 148
*in thousand barrels per calendar day
Table 2: Vertical Structure (Number of Refineries)
PAD district
Type of 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Integration East Coast Midwest Gulf Coast Rocky Mnts West Coast
full 8 18 28 6 19 79
upstream 1 2 8 0 1 12
downstream 1 10 12 3 6 32
no integration 2 2 7 5 9 25
Total 12 32 55 14 35 148
36
Table 3: Estimated Supply Relation (Dependent Variable: Pwk )
(I) (II) (III)
OLS GMM GMM
Instrument Set A Instrument Set B
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
competitive eﬀects
P r 0.926 0.011 0.721 0.202 0.915 0.008
foreclose_s -0.013 0.077 1.209 1.676 0.026 0.065
foreclose_m 0.267 0.082 -1.064 2.514 0.600 0.074
foreclose_l 0.383 0.093 3.034 2.354 0.814 0.070
eﬃciency -6.8E-7 2.8E-7 -5.67E-6 0.000 -1.07E-6 3.03E-7
input
w_rop 0.018 0.010 0.045 0.057 0.010 0.005
w_gm 0.023 0.005 0.014 0.037 0.021 0.004
p_crude 0.043 0.024 -0.229 0.412 0.029 0.020
p_ngas 0.065 0.027 0.232 0.264 0.041 0.020
crud_imp -3.230 0.147 -1.558 1.598 -3.007 0.066
back -0.062 0.055 0.265 1.378 -0.267 0.062
characteristics
ref_age -0.002 0.002 0.004 0.013 -0.003 0.002
gravity 0.032 0.013 0.029 0.149 0.026 0.009
foreign -0.025 0.064 0.911 1.663 -0.040 0.061
coop 0.160 0.070 -1.032 1.516 0.108 0.079
conglom -0.140 0.096 0.087 1.107 -0.131 0.083
maj_int -0.155 0.068 -0.524 1.021 -0.164 0.052
maj_usa 0.038 0.072 1.030 1.480 -0.006 0.056
miscellaneous
nplant -0.158 0.061 -1.418 2.637 -0.306 0.058
internet 0.020 0.090 1.003 1.265 0.012 0.056
constant -27.466 1.389 -5.588 19.613 -25.722 0.966
Observations 148 148 148
χ2 0.01 38.3
R2 0.99 0.80 0.99
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Table 4: Share of Firms with Dominating Foreclosure Eﬀect
2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Region n˜(2)/n(2) n˜(3)/n(3) n˜(4)/n(4) Total
East and Gulf Coast 0/10 4/8 0/1 4/19
Midwest 0/4 7/7 4/4 11/15
Rocky Mnts and West Coast 0/2 5/5 10/10 15/17
Total 0/16 16/20 14/15 30/51
Note: n˜(t) denotes the number of firms in the tth quartile in the distribution of firm size.
n(t) is the total number of firms in the respective quartile.
Table 5: Observed and Predicted Wholesale Prices (Cents per Gallon)
Region Pw P˜w (Pw − P˜w)
East and Gulf Coast 60.8 60.6 0.2
Midwest 59.9 59.4 0.5
Rocky Mnts and West Coast 67.15 66.6 0.55
Note: Pw denotes the actual wholesale price. P˜w denotes the predicted value for the
wholesale price in the absence of foreclosure eﬀects.
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